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ipve'i TeXto-IASa. ToA/ia yap CCKCOS (Isth. iv.
63).
And, in general, he does not admit the
resolution of the arsis (0«ris) of a dactyl ;
but in Nem. vii. 70 we find E£]f tviSa ira.[rpa6e,
and in Pyth. xi. 9 ®£/uv U[pdv. (Note that
in Pyth. xi. 57 where the MSS. are divided
between KaWlova, which involves a pro-
celeusmatic, and KOLXXWV, we should read
KakXiu), cp. alo-xiu Isth. vi. 22.) Again in
01. v. 18 we find a spondee where a dactyl
is regular, for the sake of a proper name :
T 'A\<pebv evpv pkbvr1 'I8ai[ov re
avrpov
In view of these facts, it seems possible
that, where a proper name was concerned, a
spondee might have taken the place of a
dactyl in the metre of Nem,. x. 5. I do not
see that it would be impossible, like for
instance a spondee in the second half of a
pentameter.
But I wish to retract the conjecture 'Io>
KTicrev, for I believe that I have found a
restoration, which, while not open to any
metrical objection, is in another respect
superior. Io was the daughter of Inachus
according to the best known legend (ace. to
another, daughter of Iasus). Cp. Aeschylus
Prom. 590 rrj'S 'Iva^etas, 705 'Iva^eToi' tra-ep/ua,
Sophocles, El. 4 'Ivd^ov Koprp. Read then :
iroAAa o° AlyVTTT<O KT i<r tv 'I v a ^ 1 s d<TTrj
ra t s !Tiiird<pov A
The corruption arose easily from the re-
currence of the letters IC :
KTIC<€NINAXIC>
«
The falling out of these four syllables left
AirYTTTlOlKTlCACTH
and Ka.T<pKur0ev—a passive verb seemed called
for as there was no trace of a nominative,
other than aa-rq—was a natural emendation,
which the required sense and perhaps the
juxtaposition of the last letters of Aiyuimp
easily suggested. The same considerations
which I adduced to support '!<!> support
'Iva^t's, but 'Ivagi's is better inasmuch as it
introduces implicitly the name of Inachus, to
whom Pindar was almost bound to make some
reference in his brief record of early Argive
history.—For the form 'Irak's, cp. Statius,
Theb. xii. 303, Valerius Flaccus iv. 356.
J. B. BUBY.
THE LEX SEMPRONIA AND THE BANISHMENT OF CICERO.
Tov Si (v6fi,ov elcrecfrept), «i TIS ap^iav aKpnov
tKKiK.ripV\OL TToXlTHjV, KCIT' OLVTOV SlSoVTCl KplCTLV
T<3 SrjfMo. Such are the words in which
Plutarch, V. G. Graech. 4, describes a law
passed by C. Gracchus, which has always
been understood to have some connection
with the lex Sempronia mentioned by Cicero
as establishing the principle ' ne de capite
civium Romanorum injussu populi judicare-
tur' (pro Rabir. 4, 12). The precise connec-
tion between these two passages has not
however been clearly pointed out: and yet
the manner in which we interpret the words
of Plutarch is of some importance as
throwing light on the procedure which led
to the banishment of Cicero.
There can be no doubt that the words
are a paraphrase of a Latin ' sanctio ' : and
this we may hope to reconstruct with some
success from the fortunate preservation of
the ' sanctio' of a law of the Gracchan
period, generally known as the ' lex Latina
tabulae Bantinae.' Arguing from this
analogy, we may suppose the final clause of
Gracchus' bill to have run somewhat as
follows : ' Si cons. pr. et c. senatorve
fecerit gesseritve, quo ex hace lege quae
fieri oporteat minus fiant, quaeve ex hace
lege facere oportuerit oportebitve non fecerit
sciens dolo malo : seive advorsus hanc legem
fecerit sciens dolo malo—poenam caputalem
quei volet1 inagistratus inrogato. The actual
words of the law are of little importance,
and, in spite of the fixed character of
1
 The words ' qui volet' must have occurred iu
every law that gave rise merely to a 'popularis
actio,' e.g. ' ejusque pecuuiae quei volet petitio esto '
(Lex Jul. Munic. 11. 97, 125, 140) ; but in the
Tab. Bant. (1. 9) we find the formula ' earn pequniam
quei volet magistratus exsigito ' (cf. 1. 11 ' multam
inrogare).' There is no reason why the latter
formula should not have been used of other than
monetary penalties : and a formula might be so
worded as to assign jurisdiction both to the populus
and to the plebs, see Festus s.v. publica pondere (p.
246 Mull.).
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Roman legal fornmlae, cannot be restored.
But that this was their gist the following
considerations may help to show. It is
probable that the intentio of the formula
was as wide as that conjecturally given
above, and covered senators as well as
magistrates, for Gracchus' law was aimed at
abolishing the ' quaestiones' which the
senate claimed the right to establish, and
Dio Cassius tells us (xxxviii. 14) that the
first bill of Clodius was technically aimed
as much against the senators who had
advised, as against the magistrate who had
carried out, the decree about the Catilinarian
conspirators.1 I t is also probable that the
condemnatio of the formula was as wide as
that here given, for it is in the highest
degree unlikely that C. Gracchus, the man
who meant the tribunate to be the central
power in the state, would have been content
to rest the ' sanctio' of his great plebiscitum
on the jurisdiction of the 'comitia centuriata,'
which the tribune could not summon : more
especially as the offence aimed at by the law
might be interpreted as a violation of the
'leges sacratai.' Plutarch used the word
STJ/JLOS, which in Gracchus' law may have
meant both ' populus ' and ' plebs ' : but, if the
condemnatio was narrower than that conjec-
turally given, then there can be little doubt
that S^uos in Gracchus' law meant 'plebs.' Nor
can there be any doubt that the sentence
proposed in the lex Sempronia was one
involving ' caput.' It was based on the old
principle of ' talio,' of such constant
recurrence in Roman law, which found
its fullest expression, although in a different
context, in the Edict. But the words of
the praetor ' qui magistratum potestatemve
habebit, si quid in aliquem novi juris
statuerit, ipse quandoque adversario postul-
ante eodem jure uti debet' (Dig. 2, 2, 1, 1)
were in spirit as applicable to the criminal
as to the private law of Rome.
A political situation was then reached,
which is not at all uncommon in states such
as Rome where there is no 'constitutional
law.' An act of parliament had been
1
 SenatorJ are regarded as responsible officials in
the Tab. Bant. (1. 7) and probably in the sanctions
to Clodius' law (Ad Att. iii. 12, 1 : Hi. 15, 6).
passed which was in direct conflict with a
charter: in this case the laws of the
Twelve Tables which reserved capital trials
to the centuries : and ipso facto the clause
in this charter was obrogated. But we
need not be surprised if the conservative
party refused to1 admit this obrogation.
That this was the drift of the Sempronian
law hardly admits of doubt, for Gracchus
had put his own law into force (Cic. pro
domo, 31, 82: 'ubi enim tuleras ut mihi
aqua et igni interdiceretur ? quod Gracchus
de P. Popillio—tulit).' It was an attempt
to reinforce it which directed Clodius' pro-
cedure in 58 B.C. For Rein is no doubt
right in holding (Criminalrecht, p. 497)
that the first bill of Clodius was not a
definitive sentence of the tribes, but merely
the threat of a trial. This may be gathered
even more from the general behaviour of
Clodius than from the particular statement
of Appian (B.C. ii. 15), although we cannot
afford to neglect the most fragmentary
evidence about this constitutional struggle
which comes to us from an unprejudiced
source.
It is true that the real question of the
legality of Cicero's exile turned on the
validity of Clodius' second law. To Cicero
and his friends it appeared a ' privilegium ' ;
but the validity which Clodius attributed
to it was intimately connected with his
preliminary procedure and with the formal
trial which this procedure threatened. If
the plebs had jurisdiction in the case of an
offence against C. Gracchus' law, then un-
doubtedly the tribune had the right of
passing the formal bill of outlawry against
one who had evaded trial by exile. This
power had often been exercised before by
the tribunes,2 but it gained additional
validity if we suppose that the law of
C. Gracchus definitely contemplated a trial
before the plebs as at least one of the modes
of enforcing its sanction.
A. H. GBBENIDGE.
2
 The instances are collected in Eein's Criminal-
recht, p. 485 ff. ; Kein believed that the tribunes
always had the legal right of passing the formal bill
of outlawry, although the jurisdiction of the tribes
in capital cases waa limited (p. 480).
